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Abstract—The technological evolution brought by the Internet
of things (IoT) comes with new forms of cyber-attacks exploiting
the complexity and heterogeneity of IoT networks, as well
as, the existence of many vulnerabilities in IoT devices. The
detection of compromised devices, as well as the collection and
preservation of evidence regarding alleged malicious behavior in
IoT networks emerge as a areas of high priority. This paper
presents a blockchain-based solution, which is designed for the
smart home domain, dealing with the collection and preservation
of digital forensic evidence. The system utilizes a private forensic
evidence database, where the captured evidence is stored, along
with a permissioned blockchain that allows providing security
services like integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation, so
that the evidence can be used in a court of law. The blockchain
stores evidences’ metadata, which are critical for providing
the aforementioned services, and interacts via smart contracts
with the different entities involved in an investigation process,
including Internet service providers, law enforcement agencies
and prosecutors. A high-level architecture of the blockchain-
based solution is presented that allows tackling the unique
challenges posed by the need for digitally handling forensic
evidence collected from IoT networks.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Cyber-security, Forensic evidence,
Intrusion detection, Internet of things.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of things (IoT) ecosystem is comprised of a
vast number of interconnected devices that collect, process,
generate, and share huge amounts of (possibly sensitive and
critical) information [1]. To a large extent, these devices are
highly resource-constrained, like sensors and legacy embed-
ded systems, therefore devoting most of their computational
power and storage/memory capacity to delivering their core
functionality. Strong security controls that are typically found
in today’s personal computers cannot be adopted, since they
are more resource-demanding, hence leading to the usage of
lightweight and often insecure protection mechanisms (if any)
for the data stored or transmitted. This fact, if combined with
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the complexity and heterogeneity of IoT networks that make
the design and provisioning of security solutions a challenging
task [2], allows cyber-attackers to easily compromise them and
use them as the means for launching other advanced attacks,
such as the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against
Dyn that was attributed to Mirai malware [3].
The collection of forensic evidence from the attacked IoT
devices and networks, along with their storage, preservation,
and analysis constitute major challenges [4], primarily due to
the fact that IoT devices are designed to work autonomously
and in many cases, there is no reliable method to assemble
residual evidence [5]. The utilization of intrusion detection
systems (IDS) in the collection process is important towards
identifying cyber-criminals and preventing future occurrences
of attacks [6]. In an IoT environment, the identification of a
crime scene’s boundaries and its preservation are quite hard to
accomplish while interactions continuously occur at real-time.
Since the majority of IoT devices are sensors and monitors
that record user’s personal information, privacy is an important
issue to consider in a digital forensics investigation.
This paper aims at addressing the challenges in the forensic
evidence collection, preservation and investigation process, for
IoT environments in the smart home domain, by exploiting the
advanced intrusion detection and distributed ledger technology
(DLT) solutions that are being developed in the context of the
Cyber-Trust project. More precisely, a number of mechanisms
installed at a smart home’s gateway, like profiling, monitoring,
and anomaly detection, allow to monitor the state and behavior
of IoT devices, significantly enhancing the detection of known
threats and zero-day vulnerabilities, as well as to immediately
collect forensic evidence for detected malicious interactions.
The collected data are stored at the evidence database (evDB),
hosted by the Internet service provider (ISP), along with the
metadata needed in order to allow the correlation and further
investigation of an attack’s generated events. The metadata are
published on a blockchain, which is maintained by the ISPs,
maintaining the chronological ordering of attacks’ evidences
at a global scale, thus providing the means to law enforcement
agencies (LEA) to effectively trace back an attack to its source.
The proposed solution, referred to as Cyber-Trust blockchain
(CTB), allows the entities involved in the investigation process,
such as LEAs and prosecutors, to access and handle the digital
evidence, therefore realizing the chain-of-custody (CoC) by
recording and preserving the chronological history of handling
the digital evidence. The CTB solution relies on HyperLedger
Fabric and constitutes a permissioned blockchain in order to
meet privacy requirements.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section
II presents the current state-of-the-art and related work, while
the forensic evidence collection process is described in Section
III. Section IV provides the architecture of the CTB solution
whereas concluding remarks are given in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section presents the current state-of-the-art in the areas
of intrusion detection and forensic evidence collection for IoT
environments, along with the blockchain solutions that have
been proposed.
A. IoT intrusion detection
Intrusion detection systems typically utilize signature-based
and anomaly-based techniques for identifying possible threats
in a network, where the latter relies on the monitoring of a
network’s devices for any abnormal behavioral patterns [6]. In
order to detect compromised IoT devices, the framework that is
proposed by Nguyen, et al. autonomously identifies anomalies
in an IoT network [7]; this is achieved by employing a self-
learning framework to classify devices according to their types
and generate normal profiles that are subsequently used for
the detection of deviations. A privacy-preserving architecture,
called Siotome, was proposed in [8] to provide security in
smart home environments against distributed network attacks
by malicious IoT devices; the system is able to monitor, detect
and analyze IoT-based threats, but also to provide an effective
defense framework by utilizing machine learning methods to
establish optimal operational configurations.
Smart phones are a particular type of devices within a smart
home environment, since they are mostly used for personal and
sensitive tasks, thus becoming extremely beneficial and easy
targets for adversaries. Smart phones, which are vulnerable to
attacks (e.g. viruses, Trojans, worms, etc.) common in personal
computers, but they lack the capabilities to execute highly
advanced algorithms for detecting malicious activities. Due
to this fact, IDS solutions that are often proposed to regularly
perform in-depth analysis and observe any misbehavior are
either cloud-based [9], or are performed remotely at a central
server [10], allowing optimal actions to be taken for thwarting
the attack in both architectures.
B. IoT forensics
The wide adoption of smart devices, which can provide a
wealth of forensic evidence on malicious activities during an
investigation process, necessitated the advancement of tools
and techniques for collecting residual evidences. A forensics
edge management system for the smart home environment was
introduced in [11] to gather digital evidence and deal with any
security issues; it provides intelligence, flexibility, automated
detection, and advanced data logging capabilities. The authors
in [12] proposed a forensic investigation architecture to ensure
the collection, preservation and storage of digital evidences,
while they validated their approach in a real-world smart
home environment. Focusing on a smart home’s IoT devices,
a physical analyzer called universal forensic extraction device
has been proposed for conducting forensic investigation on
smart phones [13], which has been tested on Android devices.
A comparative analysis of digital forensics tools for Android
smart phones was carried out in [14], where it was illustrated
that the choice of the tool to be used plays a crucial role in
the quality of the forensic evidence that is extracted from the
devices. In contrast to [14], a method for acquiring forensic
evidence from Android smart phones without using specialized
commercial forensics tools, i.e. by only relying on open source
software, was proposed in [15]. In all the above works, it was
shown that the collection of information from smart phones so
that it can be used as evidence in a court of law still remains
a challenging task.
C. Blockchain solutions
Blockchain solutions have recently been proposed for both
intrusion detection and forensic evidence applications, since
in both cases blockchain can solve issues pertaining to trust,
integrity, transparency, accountability, and secure data sharing.
Addressing the issue of trust management, Alexopoulos, et al.
[16] applied blockchain in collaborative intrusion detection
networks to deal with insider threats but also enhance the
security of the information shared among the participating
IDS nodes. More precisely, the authors proposed to store the
generated (raw) alerts of the network as transactions in a
permissioned blockchain. Meng, et al. [17] in addition to the
dimension of trust between the IDS nodes, refer to issues that
pertain to privacy when collaborating nodes belong to different
trust domains, as shared data may have sensitive information
linked to individuals or organizations, e.g., IP addresses and
packet payloads. Methods for exchanging encrypted content,
or only hashed data rather than raw, are considered.
In forensic investigations, it is important that the evidence
is not modified while passing from one entity to another. The
blockchain can be used in order to certify the authenticity and
legitimacy of the procedures used to gather, store and transfer
digital evidence, as well as, to provide a comprehensive view
of all the interactions in the CoC. In a blockchain-based CoC,
it is crucial to assure that members, having read/write access
to the distributed ledger, are authenticated and the evidences
are verified via a consensus algorithm. Towards that direction,
Lone, et al. propose a private blockchain that can be used in
digital forensics to ensure the integrity of evidences [18]; the
authors also aim at recording the actions taken by each entity
when interacting with the evidence. On the other hand, Probe-
IoT uses a blockchain to discover criminal events, which can
be used as evidence, by collecting interactions between IoT
devices and verify their authenticity [19].
III. FORENSIC EVIDENCE COLLECTION ARCHITECTURE
The primary goal of Cyber-Trust in the smart home domain,
or in general in small office / home office (SOHO) network, is
to accurately detect the local network’s compromised and/or
infected IoT devices to apply the appropriate countermeasures,
e.g. to isolate the devices from the rest of the network and to
proceed with the application of proper remediation measures.
The intrusion detection mechanisms that are being employed
are operating both at the device- and network-level to facilitate
the collection and subsequent correlation of forensic evidence
from various independent sources.
To combat cyber-attacks and assist the evidence collection,
IoT devices’ critical information is recorded on the blockchain
so that it can be later queried when e.g. a verification of proper
functioning is needed, or parts of the system’s software have
to be updated or patched reliably. This implies that properties,
like a device’s firmware, configuration files, etc. are registered
into the Cyber-Trust blockchain, at the beginning of system’s
operation, and verified if needed against a history of previously
valid states, in order to ensure that they have not been tampered
with. This approach fits well within the practices of software
distributors that publish hashes of software binaries to allow
verifying their authenticity.
A. Adversarial model
The adversary is a typical IoT malware botnet that actively
scans for vulnerable Linux-based IoT devices in the SOHO
network, like smart watches, home surveillance systems, smart
phones, etc., and infects the discovered vulnerable devices by
uploading and executing malware code of an unknown bot on
the compromised devices; once infected, the IoT devices may
take a variety of malicious actions. Typically, the phases of a
botnet, prior to performing attacks in a coordinated manner,
are the following.
1) Propagation: If having been infected with malware, a
smart home’s device updates its configuration and downloads
further exploits. The bot replicates itself in the SOHO network
using telnet/FTP/SSH default credentials and attacks nearby
devices with firmware vulnerabilities.
2) Rallying: The bot contacts a command & control (C&C)
server, queries for instructions, and also downloads the main
configuration files. The bot and the bot-master share a seeded
pseudorandom generator that computes the domain names.
3) Interaction: Bot-masters use a pull approach, in which
the bot should initiate contact with the C&C server, and then
poll for updates regularly. Obfuscation techniques are used, by
hiding communications in regular web traffic, hence allowing
perimeter controls to be bypassed.
As seen from above, the bot is listening for commands via
the HTTP and HTTPS protocols (utilizing ports 80 and 443)
and is assumed to execute three types of attacks, namely man-
in-the-middle (MiTM), DDoS, and spamming.
B. Architectural elements
In the sequel, we describe the high-level design of the smart
home environment’s security elements, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. An overview of Cyber-Trust’s forensic evidence collection process; it
is assumed that the red-colored devices in the smart home have been attacked
and this is detected by the SGA that collects the evidence.
The smart gateway agent (SGA) is the core component that is
responsible for the smart home’s network security by utilizing
advanced intrusion detection methods, monitoring its health
status and profiling the IoT devices’ behavior, as well as the
collection of network information including forensic evidence;
the SGA is the main link with the core platform components
running at the ISP layer (only those relevant to the evidence
collection process are depicted in Fig. 1). When a new device
is registered, the SGA performs device fingerprinting in order
to extract the device’s behavioral patterns based on network
flows — assuming that the device is initially in a clean state.
In addition, the SGA actively monitors the communication of
connected devices to detect abnormal behavior by employing
a lightweight IDS which transfers any suspicious traffic to the
platform’s back-end for deep packet inspection (DPI). Further
to the above, the SGA uses manufacturer’s usage description
(MUD) to deliver device-focused network profiling to support
accurate feature-set extraction for the anomaly detection.
More capable IoT devices, e.g. smart phones, have a smart
device agent (SDA) installed that allows the direct acquisition
of information (including evidence) from end-user IoT devices.
The SDA operates in a more restrictive manner as it is mainly
responsible for monitoring the device’s usage, critical files and
security — firmware integrity, patching status, vulnerabilities.
Information on run-time processes and the hardware resources
used is regularly synchronized with the Cyber-Trust platform’s
back-end, and more precisely the profiling service (PS).
C. Evidence collection
When suspicious network traffic and (resp. device activity)
is detected by the SGA (resp. SDA), the necessary evidence is
collected and sent to the ISP so as to be stored to the evDB.
The evidence is comprised of IP packets (amongst other data)
in the case of network attacks, whereas for device-level attacks
it might include the entire device’s image. At a minimum, the
whole process is designed to achieve the following objectives:
(a) ensure the confidentiality and integrity of forensic evidence
during transmission and storage; (b) ensure that the evidence
is collected from and destined to secure systems, which have
established a trust relationship via an attestation protocol to
authenticate the hardware/software configuration of the remote
device (such as the BIOS, MBR, firmware); and (c) compute a
non-repudiated proof of existence (along with other properties)
of the acquired forensic evidence.
As shown in Fig. 1, the latter property is achieved by means
of the CTB. The logger generates evidence log events, denoted
by the EvGen function, at the time that new evidence material
is being inserted into the evidence DB, and signs these events.
To achieve this step, the logger needs to have generated a key
pair for use with digital signature algorithms, something that
requires a certificate authority (CA) — HyperLedger Fabric’s
CA is used for that purpose. When a new signed evidence ev
is inserted in the evDB, a new identifier id is created as
id = Hash
(
ev || nonce)
where the value nonce is chosen uniformly at random to ensure
the uniqueness of the evidence’s identifier. Note that id serves
the purpose of the signed evidence log event’s integrity proof
that can be verified by means of a cryptographic hash function;
the evidence identifier, and the nonce used, are also stored in
the evDB along with the actual data.
After computing the integrity proofs of the signed evidence
log events, each proof is written to the CTB through a series
of transactions, which is denoted by the function TxGen, for
subsequent generation of the next block in CTB blockchain.
The blockchain explorer can then be used for retrieving the
immutable record of integrity proofs on the blockchain and
validate forensic evidences’ properties.
IV. FORENSIC EVIDENCE BLOCKCHAIN
In the course of digital forensic investigations, the evidence
examination needs to be carried out by authenticated entities,
while ensuring privacy requirements. Due to this fact, only the
forensic evidences’ metadata are stored in the CTB, which is a
permissioned distributed ledger build on HyperLedger Fabric,
to provide auditing and integrity services on evidence gathered
from a smart home environment. To realize the CoC and allow
the entities involved to access the digital evidence, information
about the chronological history of handling the evidence has
to be recorded. The authenticated entities that may obtain the
ownership of a forensic evidence, issue new transactions and
create blocks (that contain change of ownership information),
are classified as (also referred to as participants):
• Internet service provider. Collects the evidence regarding
a security incident from the smart home environment as
descibed in Section III-C. As the creator of the evidence,
only the ISP is able to permanently delete it, regardless
who the current owner is.
• Law enforcement agency. Can access the evidentiary data
about a particular id, IoT device, or attack that are stored
in the CTB when conducting an investigation. LEAs can
also issue new transactions to transfer ownership.
• Prosecutor. Considered to be the final owner of the digital
forensic evidence in the course of an investigation.
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Fig. 2. High-level architecture of Cyber-Trust’s blockchain.
In the high-level architecture of CTB, that is illustrated in Fig.
2, the transactions stored are about the actions performed by
the involved entities and also record the ownership transfer of
the digital evidence from the moment of its collection until it
reaches the prosecutor. The CTB is comprised of the following
core components: (a) the front-end user interface (UI), (b) the
blockchain node, (c) the trusted transaction logs, and (d) the
forensic evidence DB. More precisely:
• Front-end UI. Interface allowing the participants to view,
invoke, or query blocks, transactions, chaincodes, etc., in
the CTB; it is based on Fabric’s blockchain explorer.
• Blockchain node. This component ensures that authorized
participants can communicate with the CTB network.
• Trusted logs. Implements the blockchain and stores the
historical record of facts about when evidence was created
and how its ownership was transferred from one entity to
another so as to arrive at the current system state.
• Forensic evidence DBs. The off-chain databases, in which
the current owner of an evidence has access to, where the
raw evidentiary material is stored.
Note that there are several forensic evidence DBs, one for each
ISP, and therefore, upon request of a particular evidence, the
front-end UI delegates the request for access to the appropriate
ISP. The design of the CTB provides main function allowing
the participants to create, transfer, erase or view the evidences
stored in the evidence DB. Each function, if properly invoked,
issues and broadcasts a new transaction to the network.
CreateEvidence(id, dsc). This function submits a new block
to the CTB with the identifier id and the description dsc of
the new evidence as input. The function’s role is not just to
create a new evidence, but also checks if an evidence with
the same id has already been created. Another functionality
is to set the first owner of the evidence, which by default
is evidence’s creator (i.e. the ISP).
GetEvidence(id). Given as input an evidence identifier, the
function displays / retrieves the evidence after having first
checked that the evidence indeed exists and the requesting
participant is its current owner.
EraseEvidence(id). The function checks if the evidence with
identifier id has already been stored in the CTB and if the
invoking participant is the ISP that created the evidence. It
is evident that forensic evidences’ metadata cannot actually
be erased from the CTB, as this would imply that the entire
blockchain would have to be reformed. The function just
deletes the evidence from the evDB and then issues a new
transaction declaring that the evidence no longer exists.
TransferOwnership(id, own). Given an evidence identifier id
and a participant address own, the function checks various
conditions. First, the evidence must exist in the CTB and
the participant invoking the function has to be the current
owner of the evidence. Then, the function checks if own,
where the evidence will be transferred to, is authorized to
access the evidence. If all conditions are true, the function
transfers ownership of the evidence to the new owner own,
and the address of the new owner is added to the CTB.
New evidence is defined as a transaction having the following
metadata: the evidence identifier id, the address creator of the
ISP having collected the evidence, the description dsc of the
security incident (initialized by the creator, and later updated
by other participants) and a timestamp time of its occurrence,
the current own (resp. previous own′) owner of the evidence,
the type (type) of the attacked IoT device, as well as, the list
of time records {τi}i=1,2,... that each owner had the evidence
at his possession. The form of each transaction stored in the
CTB is the following
Tx = id || creator || dsc || time || own || own′ || type || τi .
Let us note that, in the context of HyperLedger Fabric, only
a transaction’s proposal field is shown above, which encodes
the input parameters to the chaincode for creating the proposed
ledger update; trivial fields, such as a transaction’s header and
signature, are omitted for simplicity. Since the security of CTB
is of utmost importance, a number of fundamental properties
need to hold [20], the analysis of which is outside the scope of
this work, such as persistence, liveness, chain quality property,
and common prefix property. If all true, they considerably limit
the ability of adversaries to alter CTB evidentiary metadata.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Cyber-Trust platform relies on advanced intrusion detection
tools to identify malicious activities and enhance the security
of IoT environments by inspecting compromised devices and
collecting forensic evidence so as to determine the source of
cyber-attacks. The evidentiary information is safely stored as
raw data in an off-chain database, while the hashes and meta-
data of the evidence are stored on the blockchain. The CTB
is a permissioned distributed ledger, which is build on top of
HyperLedger Fabric. Cyber-Trust’s blockchain-based solution
dematerializes the CoC process of recording and preserving a
chronological history of digital evidences.
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